In view of some recent empirical evidence, I suggest a relationship between the magnitude of search costs and the severity of adverse selection in the context of a dynamic model with asymmetric information. In markets with small search costs sellers with low quality products misrepresent their quality and demand a high price. If search costs are not negligible, sellers' price offers are truthful and all product qualities are traded over time. In markets with small search costs, a budget balanced mechanism can mitigate adverse selection: sellers should pay a per period market participation tax and receive a rebate after trading.
Introduction
Information asymmetry is a pervasive feature of real world markets: financial securities, real estate, electronics and secondhand vehicles are just a few examples. In these markets one sideusually buyers-may lack the information or experience to ascertain the true quality of a specific good. Since Akerlof's (1970) seminal article, it is a well known result that high quality goods may not be traded if buyers believe there is a high chance of buying a 'lemon.' Clearly, real world markets present a much more complex environment than the static adverse selection model, and a growing literature has been reconsidering the effects of asymmetric information in a dynamic setting.
The theoretical literature offers contrasting views. On the one hand, Janssen and Roy (2002) 
